Studies of industrial safety regulations, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in particular, often find little effect on worker safety. Critics of the regulatory approach argue that safety standards have little to do with industrial injuries, and defenders of the regulatory approach cite infrequent inspections and low penalties for violating safety standards.
Introduction
There is much evidence that OSHA inspections have not been effective in reducing injuries (Kniesner and Leeth 1995: Chapters 1 and 2). One explanation is that there are too few OSHA safety inspections to make a difference to firms. OSHA inspections also might not matter much to worker safety because of low fines or irrelevant safety regulations. In contrast to the relatively infrequent OSHA inspections in construction or manufacturing, mines regulated by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) are inspected quarterly. Also in contrast to OSHA inspections, mine safety inspectors can effect a work stoppage until a safety violation is corrected. We use recently assembled data on underground coal mine production, injuries, and safety inspection and other regulatory activity to examine econometrically the effectiveness of the regulatory approach to workplace safety where the law is potent and inspections frequent.
We find that even if we cherry-pick results to maximize the estimated effectiveness of MSHA there is an excess of inspections in mining, which has a notable cost of foregone opportunities to improve the typical miner's health through other existing means.
By way of background, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as it is formally called, was the most comprehensive and stringent Federal legislation covering the mining industry. It included surface as well as underground coal mines, required two annual inspections of every surface coal mine and four at every underground coal mine, and greatly increased federal enforcement powers in coal mines. The Coal Act required monetary penalties for all violations and established criminal penalties for knowing and willful violations. The safety standards for all coal mines were strengthened and health standards adopted. The Coal Act included specific procedures for developing improved mandatory health and safety standards and established compensation for miners who were totally and permanently disabled by the progressive respiratory disease know as black lung. At $110 million, MSHA's annual enforcement budget for coal is about half the size of OSHA's total budget for all federal and state enforcement efforts. However, in 2000 there were 1,253 establishments and 71,000 workers in coal mining versus over 1 million establishments and 23 million workers in manufacturing and construction alone. Therefore, on a per establishment basis, MSHA's enforcement budget is over 400 times larger and on a per worker basis over 150 times larger than OSHA's. (For more details see http://www.msha.gov).
A focal point of our research is to estimate an econometrically sophisticated regression model of the connection between mine inspections and mine safety outcomes. We adopt the general dynamic panel model of Arellano and Bond (1991) , which incorporates sluggish adjustment between desired safety outcomes along with endogeneity of both production and safety policy at the mine level. We purposely examine a large number (200+) of econometric specifications, including ones deliberately biased upwards, so as to find maximal MSHA effects.
The dynamic quarterly unbalanced panel model we estimate is in sharp contrast to the empirical specifications in the existing literature. Previous work examines aggregate trends in injuries without covariates directly related to MSHA activities and attributes success to MSHA if a downward trend in coal mine injuries continued or accelerated after MSHA (Lewis-Beck and Alford 1980; Weeks 1995) , or infers a positive effect of MSHA on mine safety if injuries are lower in the post-MSHA period without any consideration of the pre-MSHA pattern of injuries (Neumann and Nelson 1982; Fuess and Loewenstein 1990) . 1 Our research is distinctive not only because we allow for a general background trend in mine injuries but also because we do not simply attribute unexplained changes in injuries to mine safety regulation as we have direct measures of safety regulation enforcement.
To summarize our results, we focus on estimates of the exogenous general deterrence effects of MSHA, which capture regulatory activities for the mine's enforcement district. In only 1/200 specifications are the estimated MSHA effects on injuries negative and large relative to their standard errors. Purposely ignoring the issue that statistical significance is suspect when the data have been mined ex ante (Lovell 1983) , we then use the single set of parameter estimates most favorable to MSHA in a policy evaluation of the agency's current regulatory activities.
Even if a modest amount of MSHA's relatively small enforcement budget, say 25 percent, were reallocated to other public health programs targeted to the demographic groups that are typically miners, there would be a substantial gain in health status of the target population (about 700,000 additional life years).
Estimates Needed to Calculate Cost-Effectiveness
We begin by describing the information needed to examine the cost-effectiveness of mine safety policy. We first answer the focal question of our research. What do we need to do econometrically with our newly constructed data set on underground coal mines to estimate the response parameters required for evaluating the workplace safety effects of MSHA?
Effectiveness
Effective safety inspections can reduce deaths and injuries simultaneously. If totinj is the total number of injuries (fatal and non-fatal) then the algebraic expression for the economic benefit (B) of reducing one workplace (mining) injury is the economic value of d(totinj) = −1, which is
In Equation (2.1) VL is the revealed value of life, VI is the revealed value of avoiding injury, and 
Costs
If MSHA inspections neither ignore dangerous conditions nor concoct ones that do not exist, then the only way for MSHA to improve safety in underground coal mines is to increase 
Because diminishing returns to inspecting mines may hold in reality, Equation (2.3) produces a lower bound to the number of inspections it would take to eliminate one injury, which in turn means that calculations based on Equation (2.3) may overstate the cost-effectiveness of MSHA, giving the benefit of the doubt to the agency.
The most important aspect of our research will be the safety outcomes regressions that 
Conceptual Framework
It is helpful to place into an economic context of the firm the two partial derivatives in Equation (2.4) that are the primary components of the cost of MSHA safety enforcement activities. The small-scale economic model of the firm we present clarifies how to estimate econometrically the effectiveness of MSHA in a way that improves on the existing empirical literature concerning the cost-effectiveness of the regulatory approach to enhancing mine safety.
Consider a mine in year t with an (endogenous) optimal stock of health and safety capital In the econometric specification of the inverse safety production function that we estimate we acknowledge that the impact of MSHA enforcement involves multiple activities, each of which can have non-linear effects described by the reverse S-shape depicted in Figure 1 .
In particular, we will allow the starting level of MSHA enforcement to condition its marginal effectiveness, such that more enforcement may be ineffective when starting from either very low or very high initial levels. The shape in Figure 1 also implies that reducing MSHA somewhat from very high initial levels can be cost-effective.
Before we describe the econometric model and the resulting parameter estimates there are a few more conceptual details to flesh out in Equation (3.1). First, safety capital wears out, as does all capital, so that 1 ( ) ( Figure 1 ) MSHA has its intended effects on workplace activities. Because we do not have direct observations on investment in safety capital, t q ∆ , the estimated effect of MSHA will reflect both the direct regulatory effect on safety plus any indirect effect through the agency's impact on health and safety investments not reflected in t Z (Viscusi 1992 ). 
Econometric Background
The theoretical discussion of the last section emphasized the need for control covariates and dynamic adjustment to the ultimate equilibrium safety level. This leads naturally to the It also is important to note that there are two versions of the Arellano-Bond estimator, a one-step estimator and a two-step estimator, which adds additional complexity for the applied researcher. In the one-step estimator, the Sargan test over-rejects the overidentifying restrictions when there is heteroskedasticity. However, the standard errors of the two-step estimator are biased downward in small samples. So, the researcher generally uses both the one-step and two- 
Data
To generate our data for estimation we merge five separate data sets provided by the Mine Safety and Health Administration covering inspections, violations, assessed penalties, injuries, and production and employment. The five data sets provide unique tracking numbers for each inspection, violation, and mine. Using the violations and inspections tracking numbers we link the information on assessed penalties and violations to information on inspections. We then combine enforcement information and quarterly data on production and employment based on mine identification numbers and beginning dates of the inspections. Likewise, we tie injury information to each mine and each quarter based on the date of injury and mine identification number. 9 The merged data set we use in estimation contains quarterly information on MSHA enforcement efforts and mining injuries, employment, and production from 1983 to 1997.
Although MSHA enforcement efforts may have an immediate effect on the frequency or severity of accidents, they are unlikely to change the immediate incidence of health-related problems such as hearing loss or black-lung disease. Mine-related diseases develop gradually so that it is unlikely we can adequately determine the effect of MSHA enforcement efforts on miner health using information spanning the 15 years available. Accordingly, we exclude from the original data set all inspections focusing on health (such as inspections of a mine's ventilation system or monitoring for dust, noise or silica). To narrow our focus further to inspections likely to improve miner safety directly, we also exclude all MSHA actions not on mine property, activities related to education and training, investigations for discrimination, and audits of accident, injury, illness, and employment records. In every case where we exclude an inspection or MSHA activity we likewise exclude the resulting citations, orders, and penalties. The degree of operator negligence may at least partially explain the much larger average fine on withdrawal orders than on citations. Approximately 88 percent of the violations resulting in a withdrawal order were classified by MSHA inspectors as caused by a high degree of operator negligence or reckless disregard of miner safety, whereas only about 2 percent of the violations resulting in the issuance of a citation were caused by a high degree of operator negligence or reckless disregard of miner safety.
Besides a monetary penalty, withdrawal orders also shut down production, which imposes a potentially large cost if operations are disrupted for an extended period. At least 50 percent of the withdrawal orders were terminated fairly quickly, in one day or less, but for a sizable number the days from issuance to termination extended for weeks and, in some cases, months and years. Because of the extremes, the average number of days from issuance to termination is large, 32.2 days. Appendix A provides additional details of the distribution of lost days. As shown, 25 percent of all withdrawal orders from 1983 to 1997 extended for six days or more, and 5 percent extended for 112 days or more. With such a potentially long shut down period, mines had strong incentives to avoid conditions likely to result in withdrawal orders.
Additionally, the harsh penalties shown in Appendix A for failure to abate and imminent danger hazards likely motivated mines to rectify previously discovered problems and avoid conditions liable to result in death or severe injury. By way of contrast, the incentives to avoid citations resulting only in monetary penalties were quite small. From 1983 to 1997, 95 percent of all citations had initial fines less than $447, and 99 percent had initial fines less than $1,158. By law, mines must continue to pay miners for the remainder of the shift during which a withdrawal order is issued and for up to four hours the next day if the withdrawal order is still in effect, meaning that the monetary losses from a withdrawal order almost always substantially exceed the losses from a simple citation resulting in a fine.
As can be seen in Panel C of 
Econometric Results
We now describe the large number of specifications of a dynamic mine safety equation that we estimated. In contrast to Sala-I-Martin (1997) who examines several million regressions to find the true model of country growth, we search among a large number of regressions to find the single set of results most favorable to MSHA. We then use our shamelessly data mined results in best-case calculations of the cost effectiveness of MSHA and its implications for improving the health and safety of the population typically working as miners.
Our research also is similar to a meta-analysis on one data set because, in the process of estimating a large number of econometric specifications, we will, as a by-product, see if a pattern emerges with regards to the effectiveness of MSHA in influencing miner safety. The large number of regression specifications (200+) comes about because we consider various (1) safety measures (total injuries, injury rate, fatal injuries, non-fatal injuries, zero versus some injuries),
(2) MSHA activities (specific abatement, general deterrence, both), (3) instrument sets (small, medium, large), (4) time frames (quarterly, annual), (5) distributed lag structures (1, 4, and 8 quarters), (6) output measures (production, labor hours), (7) degrees of non-linearity in MSHA effects (linearity, cubic, orthogonal polynomials), (8) time effects (yes, no), (9) location effects (yes, no), (10) non-exogeneity of MSHA's mine-specific abatement activities (yes, no), and (11) estimation techniques (GMM, OLS, Tobit, Heckit, count models). The conclusion emerging is that the results in the overwhelming number of cases are unfavorable to the safety enhancement objective of MSHA at current levels of regulation. which is the number of workers in quarter t at mine i that have a lost-workday injury, including death. Exogenous variables include quarterly time dummies and mine district location dummies, which are described in Appendix B. Always treated as predetermined is our primary measure of mining activity, the log of total employee hours worked, lhour it .
Key Regression Variables
We consider three specifications for MSHA activities: models with general (mine-district level) deterrence measures, models with specific (to the mine itself) deterrence measures, and where general deterrence is part of x 1 , specific deterrence is part of w and time and location effects are conditioned out in x 2 . Although one can consider the dynamic patterns in coal mine injuries here, we are generally interested in equilibrium multiplier effects of MSHA, which are
Focal Regression
We could not produce a single regression using mine-specific abatement measures that had an estimated negative effect for MSHA, which we attribute to the inability of the instrumental variables approach to correct for the endogeneity of MSHA whereby additional injuries in a mine trigger additional inspections. Regressions with specific deterrence regressors that parallel our focal regression in terms of specification and instrument sets appear in Appendix C. For our subsequent cost-effectiveness calculations we selected the only regression from over 200 that simultaneously satisfied the following criteria: computational feasibility (maximum lag length for an instrument is 15 quarters), quarterly data; time and location dummies; four-quarter lags on the injury rate, production, and MSHA; at least one negatively signed MSHA coefficient that is 1.68 times its standard error; and the estimated equilibrium impact effect of MSHA is also
The only (one-step Arellano and Bond) regression that satisfied the intersection of our model selection criteria just described produced the following result, where underline indicates that the coefficient was 1.68 times its (robust) standard error: Our focal regression Equation (6.2) yields an equilibrium impact multiplier for lindam that is small, positive and statistically insignificant (which we will subsequently ignore in our policy simulations), an equilibrium impact multiplier for penum that is -0.31, which implies an elasticity at the means of -0.25, and an equilibrium impact multiplier for wonum that is −2.53, which implies an elasticity at the means of -0.16. 14 Interestingly, both of the estimated MSHA effects in (6.2) are close to the results in Scholtz and Gray (1990) for the general deterrence effects of OSHA.
MSHA Cost-Effectiveness Calculations
Before considering the economic and policy implications of our results, we note that Attempting to disentangle all the potential influences on miner health would be difficult econometrically, to say the least. Even more problematic would be trying to relate health improvements to specific inspections given the long lag-time between worker exposure and any signs of worker ill health. Our research, therefore, focuses on the impact of MSHA general and safety-related inspections on miner safety. We exclude from our empirical work enforcement activities not on mine property, including computer generated dust sampling, education and training activities, and inspections geared specifically toward health issues. Because general and safety-related inspections uncover few health-related problems, changes in the number of the inspections we examine should have little impact on miner health. 
Baseline Values
We now turn our attention to the arithmetic details of safety inspections' costs and benefits. Viscusi (1993) and Viscusi and Aldy (2002) argue that the range of reasonable valueof-life estimates is from $3 million to $7 million and that the value of a lost workday injury is about $50,000 ($1990 where VL is the value of a life saved, and VI is the value of an injury prevented. in all inspections was 0.3165. In the last quarter of 1997, the number of mines that had been operating for at least five quarters (the minimum necessary to be in the estimation sample) was 572.
Substituting the inspection and mines operating numbers into Equations (7.4) and (7.5) and then substituting the derivatives of Equations (7.4) and (7.5) with respect to I into Equation regression results from Section 6 produces a lower bound for dI = 3,584.
We have MSHA supplied information on inspector time for 99 percent of the 252,411
inspections of the underground coal mines in our estimation sample. Time is broken down into four categories: travel, report writing, surface inspections, and mechanized mining unit inspections. For the total sample the average and median total inspection times were 29.8 hours and eight hours. Excluding the longest 1 percent of inspections by total time, the average and median inspection lengths were 24.7 hours and eight hours.
According to the Position Classification Standard for Mine Safety and Health, GS-1822,
a starting underground coal mine inspector would have a government service classification of 9.
In 2001, GS-9, step 1 received an hourly wage of $15.93
(http://www.opm.gov/oca/01tables/gshrly/html/01gshr.htm).
Ignoring overhead costs and using the median inspection length, the minimum cost of the 3,584 additional inspections needed to reduce total coal mine injuries by one would then be (in 
Cost/Benefit
What then is the cost-benefit ratio when we ignore the fact that we cherry-picked regression results to get the most favorable impact of MSHA and, in turn, use the least possible cost of an inspection? The estimated cost of eliminating an injury is $463,966 and the benefit from eliminating an injury is $219,443. The implied cost/benefit ratio for the most favorable case we can construct for MSHA is about 2.1 > 1. At current levels safety inspections are not costbeneficial.
Cost of Reducing One Fatality
We might also address the cost-effectiveness issue somewhat differently and focus on either reducing fatalities in isolation or on reducing non-fatal injuries in isolation. Because 0.46 percent of all injuries are fatalities, eliminating fatality would require reducing total injuries by 1/0.0046 = 217. Because few injuries in mining are fatal, Equation (6.6) indicates that the number of additional inspections required to eliminate one miner death would then be 779,155.
Evaluated at the median time per inspection the cost of eliminating one fatality would be 779,156
× 8 × $16.18 = $100,865,530.
As a reference point for comparison and evaluation, we can consider that regulatory allocations involve an opportunity cost as they impose real financial costs on consumers and taxpayers because the money spent on regulatory costs would otherwise be spent on other bundles of consumer commodities. Based on such risk-risk tradeoff considerations, economists have estimated that when government agencies propose risk reducing regulations that impose a cost per life saved at levels of about $69 million or more ($2002) , then on balance the regulation is harming individual health (Viscusi 1994 (Viscusi , 1998 . So, it is important to recognize that the MSHA cost of saving a life is about 1.5 times the cutoff point for an acceptable life-saving regulation from broad social perspective that a policy analyst should use.
To put the amount of additional inspections needed to reduce fatalities by one into perspective (again ignoring the general lack of statistical significance of MSHA safety inspections), in 1997 the total coal enforcement budget for MSHA was $107 million (Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1999). In 1997 there were 72,390 inspections of coal mines. 17 The total cost per inspection in 1997 was therefore $1,478, which includes more than just labor cost of the inspector. In $2002, the cost of eliminating one fatality would then be 779,156 × $1,501 ≅ $1.17 billion, which is over 10 times the annual enforcement budget. Put differently, the increase in inspections needed to eliminate one miner death is more than 10 times the total number of inspections now conducted by MSHA.
Cost of Reducing One Injury
To eliminate one non-fatal injury would require an additional 3,601 inspections using Equation (7.6). The lower bound estimate of eliminating a non-fatal injury using the median inspection time and the average cost per inspection is then 3,601 × 8 × $16.18 = $466,167, which is over 2.6 times the estimated benefit of an injury foregone.
Discussion: Policy Implications for Miners' Health
It has frequently been suggested that regulatory programs be subjected to continued OMB review for cost and effectiveness (Kniesner and Viscusi 2003 and references therein). We close with an example how a cost-effectiveness review could be applied to MSHA because it may help to frame the policy implications of our empirical results. It will make things more transparent, too, to recast our estimated MSHA effects in terms of life years gained, on balance, if some of the MSHA enforcement budget were reallocated to a few identifiable other programs that would likely affect the health of miners.
Cost Per Life Year Saved by MSHA
As we have noted, the proportion of fatal injuries to all injuries is 0.0046, and the proportion of nonfatal lost workday injuries to all injuries is 0.9954. 
The average age of miners killed on the job in the estimation sample is 37.9. Based on life expectancy tables posted at the National Center for Health Statistics the remaining life expectancy of a 38 year old is 40.7 years. Using a 5 percent real interest rate (as applied in Tengs et al. 1995) , the discounted number of life years saved from avoiding one mining death is then 17.3.
The average days lost from work due to a nonfatal injury in the estimation sample is 39.17. We calculate average days lost replacing reported days lost with statutory days lost for all permanent total or permanent partial disabilities with reported days lost of zero. On average, a miner loses 0.107 of a work year from a nonfatal injury. Substituting 17.3 for lost years due to death and 0.107 for lost years due to nonfatal injury into the equation above, the number of life years saved for every miner injury avoided is 0.186. 
Improving Health for the Target Population
Our estimates imply that using the most optimistic estimated effects from Section 7, it costs about $2,500,000 per life year gained via MSHA enforcement activities. The appropriate public policy issue, then, is whether there are cheaper ways to improve the health of the population overall or of miners in particular.
A rich source of information for our ultimate policy evaluation exercise is Tengs et al. MSHA is small relative to other well-known regulatory agencies. In recent years, the overall budget of OSHA has been 1.7 times the budget of MSHA, and the annual budget of the EPA has been 24.6 times the budget of MSHA. Let us just consider now the annual enforcement budget of MSHA for coal, which is about $110 million. One-fourth of the MSHA enforcement budget is $27.5 million. At a cost of $2,500,000 per life year, a 25 percent reduction in MSHA inspections would reduce life years by about 11, which is less than one statistical miner's life.
Using the list in Tengs et al. (1995) , programs that could affect the health of persons who might be in the population of miners would include more heart disease screening or more on-site defibrillators, as suggested recently by OMB, which would each produce a life year at a cost of $40. So, moving $27.5 million from the MSHA enforcement budget into more heart disease screening or defibrillators would gain on balance 687,489 = (687,500 -11) life years for the affected population, which is equivalent to about 16,800 statistical miners' lives.
The point of the exercise is to demonstrate that even a program as small as MSHA can have relatively large opportunity costs. We have shown that a modest amount of reallocation of program expenditures can make a substantial improvement in the public health of the target population. Although there are specific mandates via OSHA and MSHA addressing workplace health and safety, funding levels for OSHA and MSHA and their target activities are legislative decisions. As policy analysts, we argue for cost-effective government policy in the area of promoting health and longevity. Our estimates demonstrate the sizeable potential gain in miners'
health from budgetary reallocation to other existing programs. We believe our estimates clearly imply a need for government to take a more transcendental view by considering public health more generally and consider more comprehensively the options available to improve the health of the working population. Besides conducting inspections, the regional offices also review mine plans for safety concerns. The mine operator devises appropriate engineering plans, and then the engineering specialists at MSHA review and approve the proposed plans. Once approved, the mine operator must follow the plans. Specific areas include control of mine roof and ventilation system. η posnum = −0.043 , η sumwo = −0.041 P(no 1 st order serial correlation) = 0.00, P(no 2 nd order serial correlation) = 0.17
-0.02∆wonum t -0.68∆wonum t-1 + 0.09∆wonum t-2 + 0.27∆wonum t-3 -0.52∆wonum t-4 + γ 1 time dummies + γ 2 location dummies. Predetermined variables are like lagged y's in terms of adding columns to the instrument matrix. In our estimation we work with 1 to 8 lags of y, 1 to 3 predetermined variables, 1 to 206 x's, with the maximum T = 55 and i = 3450, so that our models are often constrained by the maximum feasible width of Z in STATA.
8.
Simple and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Greene 2003, Chapter 20) reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in totinjt, our focal dependent variable.
9.
Because MSHA does not list contractor production, employment, and injury data separately for each mine, we exclude outside contractors from our research.
10.
We define a mine as operating in a quarter if it employed at least one hour of labor.
11.
In many cases, the monetary penalty for a violation resulting in a withdrawal order is added to a previous citation.
12.
All penalties (monetary and withdrawal orders) are for violations of standards deemed serious or substantial where the likelihood of an injury occurring is viewed to be likely, highly likely, or has already occurred.
13.
Remember that the 5 percent nominal significance level for a one-sided hypothesis test is only a heuristic because of the large amount of data mining behind the regression result. A useful approximate result described in Lovell (1983) for the connection between the true and claimed levels of significance is that α(claimed) = (k/c) × α(true), where a search has been conducted for the best k out of c candidate explanatory variables' coefficients.
14. To try to enlarge the estimated effect of MSHA we have also estimated the statistically most biased dynamic panel regression models, which are OLS, IV fixed effects and IV first-differences (Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer 2000; Bond 2002 ). In the IV fixed effects results no general deterrence coefficient was at least 1.68 times its standard error, and the results from IV first differences did not satisfy the basic stability condition that j j α ∑ < 1 . OLS results yield no coefficient for either lindam or penum that is both negative and at least 1.68 times its standard error and ˆw onum η = −0.19. Finally, the estimated effects of MSHA are positive when we smooth our quarterly data by annualizing it.
15.
For the mines in our estimation sample we have data on 499,940 serious violations of MSHA standards (hazards likely to result in injury). Of the almost half million violations, 94 percent were discovered during general and safety-related inspections where over 99 percent of the citations were for safety hazards.
16. Attempts to find subtle threshold effects of the type depicted in Figure 1 were mostly unsuccessful, so our calculations use a constant value for the impact of MSHA. The cubic in MSHA that will capture the non-linearity of threshold effects also produces collinearity among m, m2, and m3 that necessitates the use of orthogonal polynomials regression. In the orthogonal polynomials regressions paralleling Equation (6.1), the only polynomials with a coefficient whose value exceeded 1.0 were for ∆wonumt−3 and ∆wonumt−4, and in both cases the coefficients (of ∆wonum2(t−3) and ∆wonum(t−4)) were negative, which is contrary to the possible ineffectiveness of MSHA at relatively high or low levels of enforcement depicted in Figure 1 . On the other hand we also estimated simple dynamic censored (ZINB, Tobit, and Heckit) regression models that take explicit account of the fact that about 50 percent of the observations on the dependent variable are zero. The results show that MSHA has no effect at the extensive margin and all of its effect is at the intensive margin, which implies that at low levels of injury, MSHA is ineffective at reducing injuries (to zero). For econometric background on sophisticated censored dynamic panel models see Hu (2002) .
17. MSHA supplied inspection data for underground, surface, and mills -including mandatory inspections and investigations, enforcement activities not on mine property, and education and training evaluations.
18
. Tengs et al. (1995) 
19.
A short list includes installing car windshields with adhesive bonding instead of rubber gaskets, laws requiring smoke detectors in homes, mandatory motorcycle helmet laws, banning residential growth in tsunami-prone areas, banning sale of three-wheel ATVs, rubella vaccinations for children age two, and smoking cessation advice for pregnant women who smoke. For the interested reader, we note that the most expensive programs per life year gained ($2002) include sickle cell screening for non-black low risk newborns ($42 billion) and applying chloroform limits on private wells to emissions at the 48 worst case pulp mills ($123 billion). 3 Excludes the 14,083 withdrawal orders failing to report the degree of operator negligence. 4 Excludes the 501 withdrawal orders lacking termination dates. 5 Statistics are calculated for the 149,519 inspections imposing a monetary penalty. 6 Monetary penalties were assessed on all inspections discovering a serious violation. 7 We calculate the average by first totaling all monetary penalties for a given inspection. Then for each mine in each quarter, we average the penalty per inspection across all inspections with penalties. Statistics are generated for the 67,594 nonzero observations. 8 Averages are determined as described in footnote 7 excluding all nonserious violations. Statistics are generated for the 57,517 nonzero observations. 1983q1  1984q1  1985q1  1986q1  1987q1  1988q1  1989q1  1990q1  1991q1  1992q1  1993q1  1994q1  1995q1  1996q1  1997q1   0   10   20   30   40   50   60   70   80   90   31  36  41  46  51  56  61  66  71  76  81  86  91  96 Passage of the 1969 Coal Act
